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FOUR PRINCIPLES FOR DIGITAL EXPRESSION 
(YOU WON’T BELIEVE #3!) 
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON* & NEIL M. RICHARDS** 
ABSTRACT 
 
At the dawn of the Internet’s emergence, the Supreme Court 
rhapsodized about its potential as a tool for free expression and political 
liberation. In ACLU v. Reno (1997), the Supreme Court adopted a bold 
vision of Internet expression to strike down a federal law - the 
Communications Decency Act - that restricted digital expression to forms 
that were merely “decent.” Far more than the printing press, the Court 
explained, the mid-90s Internet enabled anyone to become a town crier. 
Communication no longer required the permission of powerful entities. 
With a network connection, the powerless had as much luck reaching a 
mass audience as the powerful. The “special justifications or regulation of 
the broadcast media” had no application to the “vast democratic forums 
of the Internet.” 
Twenty years later, the Roberts Court had an opportunity to explain 
how the First Amendment should operate in the mature Internet of 2017. 
Despite the interval of time, the Roberts Court of 2017 took a remarkably 
similar approach to the Rehnquist Court of 1997. In Packingham v. North 
Carolina, Justice Kennedy announced the start of the “Cyber Age.” The 
Internet was the virtual public square, much like streets and parks. 
Because the “Internet” was still in its infancy, its impact on expression 
was not fully understood. The expressive potential of the “Internet” would 
be imperiled in the absence of a hands-off approach. Justice Kennedy 
noted that someday, the Internet might be used for anti-social ends. Until 
then, extreme caution was in order so the Internet’s democratic potential 
could be realized. 
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Contrary to the Court’s thinking, the Internet is no longer in its 
infancy. It has matured at a breathtaking pace. Virtually all aspects of our 
public and private lives - politics, child-rearing, work, health, shopping, 
and sex - involve the Internet. If online discourse ever accorded with the 
Court’s vision, it does not now. Rather than just the virtual town square, 
the “Internet” is bound up in everything and everywhere-whether the 
workplace, library, coffee shop, gym, park, public street, town square, or 
bedroom. 
This article debunks the Court’s magical thinking about the Internet. 
The Internet’s expressive opportunities are not available to all on equal 
terms, thanks to the wide availability of personal data. Online platforms 
highlight favored content while burying disfavored ones. Search engines 
produce different, and less advantageous, results to people of color and 
women than to men. Cyber mobs shove people offline with doxxing, 
swatting, and other privacy-invasive forms of abuse. Online platforms fuel 
polarization and filter bubbles, ensuring an electorate without access to a 
full range of ideas and information. Fake news spreads like wildfire on 
social media platforms that are often people’s main source of information. 
We need clear principles to guide and secure meaningful digital free 
expression. This article charts a path to provide just that. Part I exposes 
crucial myths surrounding the digital speech and privacy in our networked 
age. Part II offers a conception of free speech based on a distrust of 
power, both public and private. Even if doctrinal analysis does not 
account for private barriers to free expression, the project of free 
expression should. Part III lays out four essential preconditions for a 
theory and a system of free expression in the digital age. These 
preconditions are substantive and procedural. They require legal 
intervention and extra-legal efforts. They draw some inspiration from due 
process guarantees and some from commitments to equality. Underlying 
these principles is a unifying normative commitment: If we want to ensure 
that our commitment to long-standing democratic theories of free 
expression survives its translation to the digital environment, we need to 
take a long, hard look at the digital public sphere we actually have, rather 


















At the dawn of the Internet’s public emergence, the Supreme Court 
rhapsodized about its potential for free expression and political liberation. 
In Reno v. ACLU,1 the Supreme Court adopted a bold vision of Internet 
expression in striking down a federal law—the Communications Decency 
Act—that would have limited digital expression to forms that were merely 
“decent.” Far more than the printing press, the Court explained, the mid-
‘90s Internet of web pages and chat rooms enabled anyone to become a 
virtual town crier. Speakers no longer needed the permission of powerful 
media companies to reach the public, because the Internet levelled the 
playing field between powerless speakers and powerful printers or 
broadcasters. Unlike mass media that controlled what content would reach 
people in their homes, the Internet enabled all manner of speakers and 
expression to reach the public at large assuming they had a computer, a 
modem and a phone line. As a result, the Court held that the “special 
justifications for regulation of the broadcast media” had no application to 
the “vast democratic forums of the Internet.”2 
Exactly twenty years later, the Roberts Court had an opportunity to 
explain how the First Amendment should operate in the face of a mature 
Internet. Despite the lapse of time, and the massive technological shifts to 
broadband, social media, and ubiquitous smartphones, the Roberts Court of 
2017 took a remarkably similar approach to the Rehnquist Court of 1997. 
In Packingham v. North Carolina,3 Justice Kennedy announced the start of 
the “Cyber Age,” featuring the Internet as the “modern public square.” 
Because the Internet was still in its infancy, he suggested, its impact on 
expression could not be fully understood. Law could imperil the Internet’s 
expressive potential. Someday, the Internet might be used for antisocial 
ends, Justice Kennedy noted, but until then, extreme caution was necessary 
to protect the Internet’s democratic potential.4 
Contrary to the Court’s thinking, the Internet is not a babe in the woods. 
Nor is it separate from everyday life. Today, virtually all aspects of our 
public and private lives—politics, child-rearing, work, health, shopping, 
and sex—involve the Internet. If online discourse ever accorded with the 
Court’s vision, it certainly does not now. Social interaction, intellectual 
exploration, political and cultural engagement, employment, and all other 
manner of life’s projects involve networked technologies. Rather than just 
                                                 
1. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
2. Id. at 868. 
3. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
4. Id. at 1737.  











the virtual town square, the Internet is bound up in everything we do and 
everywhere we do it—whether in the workplace, library, coffee shop, gym, 
park, street, or old-fashioned town square.  
Meanwhile, the Internet’s indispensability is paired with its inequality of 
control and opportunity. Private owners of Internet infrastructure, from 
content layer to backbone, block, filter, mute, and decrease the visibility of 
online expression, making it difficult for some to engage in public 
discourse. Not only do companies determine who participates, but they 
control what content is available and to whom. Online service providers and 
search engines tailor people’s online experiences based on fine-grained 
surveillance about their past communications, interactions, and activities. 
When searching for “financial news,” for example, African Americans may 
see stories on payday loans while whites may see links for low-interest 
mortgages. People over forty may not see advertisements for employment, 
thanks to algorithms facilitating Facebook Ads.5 While government 
censorship remains a danger, communication and participation in the digital 
age are imperiled by private power as well as that of the state.  
This essay takes a critical look at the theory of the Internet and expression 
implicit in Reno and Packingham. In so doing, it seeks to debunk some of 
the Court’s magical thinking about the Internet. Contrary to the Court’s 
assumptions, the Internet’s expressive opportunities are not available to all 
on equal terms. Everyone cannot be a virtual town crier as the Court 
imagined. Private entities serve as powerful gatekeepers to digital 
expression. The design of our digital infrastructure can preclude people 
from accessing online platforms.6 Platforms highlight favored content while 
burying or blocking disfavored ones (more often unpopular speakers). 
Search engines produce different, and less advantageous, results to the 
vulnerable than to the powerful.7 Cyber mobs shove people offline with 
doxxing, swatting, and other privacy-invasive forms of abuse.8 Fake news 
                                                 
5. Julia Angwin, Ariana Tobin & Madeleine Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing 
Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www. 
propublica.org/article/ facebook-advertising- discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin. 
6. See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN 
OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES (2018). 
7. LaTanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery, COMM. ACM, May 2013, at 44, 
45; Sonia Katyal, Algorithmic Civil Rights, 103 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (on file with author) 
(discussing study where women disproportionately see ads for less well-paying jobs than men searching 
same terms). 
8. See generally DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014) [hereinafter 
CITRON, HATE CRIMES]; Danielle Keats Citron, Online Engagement on Equal Terms, B.U. L. REV. 
ONLINE (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/bulronline/citron-online-engagement-on-
equal-terms/; Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 
108 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2009); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009); 
Danielle Keats Citron, Yale ISP—Reputation Economies in Cyberspace Part 3, YOUTUBE (Dec. 8, 
2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XVEL4RfN3uQ. 












spreads like wildfire on social media sites, which may be people’s main 
source of information.9 Internet service providers surveil our online 
activities, sharing them with online advertisers who tailor the content made 
visible to us.10  
Although these massive corporations—whether they call themselves 
“social media,” “tech companies,” or “neutral platforms”—hold most of the 
cards, the First Amendment has almost no application to their policies. The 
central battleground for free speech and privacy will be fought in corporate 
boardrooms rather than in the courts. The most important legal instruments 
governing free speech on the Internet today are not derived from the 
Constitution, but from contract law—the terms of service governing the 
relationship between Internet companies and their customers. 
Our argument proceeds in three steps. Part I exposes crucial myths 
surrounding digital speech and privacy in our networked age. Part II offers 
a conception of free speech based on a distrust of power, both public and 
private. Even if constitutional doctrine does not account for private barriers 
to free expression, we argue, the project of free expression must. Part III 
lays out four essential preconditions for a theory and a system of free 
expression in the digital age. 
Let us be clear at the outset: We remain committed to robust free 
expression and to the spirit of New York Times v. Sullivan.11 We believe that 
the outcomes in Reno and Packingham are correct. The First Amendment 
does and should prohibit the state from reducing digital expression to that 
which is “decent” and fit for children; the First Amendment does and should 
prohibit the state from indiscriminately barring felons (or anyone else) from 
the Internet. But theory matters. And good theories should bear a close 
relationship to the messy reality we live in rather than to utopian visions that 
ignore obvious power dynamics. Underlying our four principles is a 
unifying normative commitment to ensuring that our traditional free speech 
values survive the translation to the digital environment. That will require 
taking a long, hard look at the digital public sphere that we actually have, 
rather than one we might want to have or that Silicon Valley has tried to sell 
to us. 
                                                 
9. See generally Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Crisis for National 
Security, Democracy and Privacy?, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/deep-
fakes-looming-crisis-national-security-democracy-and-privacy. 
10. NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE (2015) [hereinafter RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY]; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of 
Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013); Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 
GEO. L.J. 689 (2013). 
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8; RICHARDS, 
INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY, supra note 10. 











I. THE REALITIES OF DIGITAL EXPRESSION 
For twenty years, the Supreme Court has remained steadfast in its 
characterization of the Internet as a virtual “public square” that enables 
anyone to become a “town crier.”12 That vision overlooks crucial realities 
confronting speakers and audiences in the digital age. Jurisprudential folly, 
misguided policy, and injustice can result from such misunderstandings. 
The Court needs a Brandeis brief on the lived realities of digital expression, 
which this part supplies.  
A. The Idealized Internet 
In Reno v. ACLU, decided in 1997, the Court described the Internet as 
constituting “vast democratic forums.”13 At issue in Reno were provisions 
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) that criminalized the 
“knowing” transmission of “obscene or indecent” messages to underage 
recipients, or “knowingly” sending or displaying to a minor any message 
“that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory 
activities or organs.”14 In essence, the law was an attempt to ensure that 
content on the Internet was “decent” and fit for children.  
The Supreme Court struck down those provisions of the CDA as 
unconstitutionally vague.15 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, held that 
the law impermissibly risked limiting adults’ access to material, such as 
literature, that included content the state might deem “indecent.”16 For the 
Court, Internet expression was too important to be limited only to what 
government officials think is fit for children.17  
The Court underscored that unlike mass media that concentrated power 
over expression in the hands of the few, the Internet distributed power over 
expression to the many.18 The Court characterized the Internet in this way: 
“Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become 
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any 
soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, 
the same individual can become a pamphleteer.”19 The special justifications 
for the regulation of content decency in broadcast media thus had no 
                                                 
12. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
870 (1997). 
13. 521 U.S. at 868. 
14. Id. at 859–60. 
15. Id. at 874. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 875. 
18. Id. at 870. 
19. Id.  












application to the Internet.20 The Internet should be treated as a newspaper 
rather than a television station broadcasting over a scarce resource.21 
Twenty years later, the Court in Packingham v. North Carolina struck a 
similar chord.22 This time, the issue was the constitutionality of a state law 
prohibiting registered sex offenders from accessing social network sites 
used by minors.23 The Court talked about the Internet as if little had changed 
in twenty years. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, declared that 
“cyberspace” was a “quintessential forum for the exercise of First 
Amendment rights” much like a public street or park.24 Social media sites 
were hailed as special zones of public discourse.25 According to the 
majority, social networks “provide perhaps the most powerful mechanisms 
available to a private citizen to make his or her voice heard.”26 Social media 
“allows users to gain access to information and communicate with one 
another about it on any subject that might come to mind.”27 As the Court 
observed, on social media platforms like Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter, 
individuals can debate religion and politics, look for employment, and 
petition government representatives.28 
The Court struck down the North Carolina law because it burdened 
substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s 
legitimate interest in protecting minors from registered sex offenders.29 The 
government’s interest could not justify a prohibition that operated as a 
“complete bar to the exercise of First Amendment rights on websites 
integral to the fabric of our modern society and culture.”30 As a result, the 
statute was facially unconstitutional because it excluded sex offenders from 
the “modern public square.”31   
B. From Myth to Reality  
Today’s Internet is not the virtual town square mythologized by the 
Court. Although the Internet enables interaction, creativity, discussion, 
persuasion, and access to knowledge, it enables far more than public 
                                                 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017). 
23. Id. at 1733–34. 
24. Id. at 1735. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 1737.  
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 1735. 
29. Id. at 1738.  
30. Id. 
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discourse.32 Online platforms host a dizzying array of activities, from work 
and play to commercial activities and group associations.33 Some sites and 
profiles are de facto workplaces. Some establish professional bona fides 
necessary to attract clients and business. Some operate as stores with hubs 
for consumer reviews. Some facilitate illicit activities, such as the purchase 
of drugs, sex, passwords, and stolen credit card numbers. Some are part of 
educational institutions or their virtual equivalents. Some are password 
protected; others are accessible to all comers.34  
Beyond its one-dimensional view of the Internet as a virtual town square, 
the Court makes other important errors about digital expression. As this 
section explores, digital expressive opportunities are neither limitless nor 
uniform. This results from several factors, including the private nature of 
our digital infrastructure; the censorial power of companies (at times exerted 
at the behest of non-U.S. nations); the silencing impact of cyber mobs, 
stalkers, and trolls; and distinct pathologies of our networked environment. 
1. The Nature of the “Public Square” 
At the risk of stating the obvious, the defining hallmark of the “public 
square” is that it is public. This is true in at least two important senses of the 
word. First, the public square is “public” in the sense that it is owned by the 
public.35 Think, in this respect, of “public schools” or the “public sector,” 
Owned by the people for (at least in theory) the benefit of all Second, a 
public square is “public” in the sense that it is open to the public.36 Public 
parks, streets, and sidewalks are available for public access and use as a 
matter of constitutional right. The Supreme Court has built the public forum 
doctrine on the premise that parks, streets, and sidewalks have been open 
for speech “immemorially . . . time out of mind.”37 Legislatures can place 
time, place, and manner restrictions on public fora; they can even close 
them.38 But they cannot restrict access to them based on the content of 
speech or the viewpoint of speakers. 
                                                 
32. See CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8. We use the term public discourse to mean, as Jack 
Balkin suggests, “the processes of communication that allow public opinion to serve as the judge of 
society.” Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 
1072 (2016). 
33. See id. 
34. See supra note 8. 
35. GREGORY MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST AMENDMENT 100 
(2017). 
36. Id. at 101. 
37. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). 
38. Cf. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (Mass. 1895), aff’d, Davis v. Massachusetts, 
167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897). 












The Internet is substantially different from the public square along these 
dimensions of ownership and openness. The Internet, as experienced by 
most users, is not publicly-owned. Private companies oversee the digital 
infrastructure, commonly thought of as a series of layers or stacks.39 At the 
risk of oversimplifying, the layers of the Internet are envisioned as ranging 
from content that can be read or interacted with at the top layer, transmission 
protocols in the middle layer, and physical infrastructure on the bottom 
layer. At the top layer, platforms publish content, enabling the posting and 
consumption of words, images, and videos.40 Search engines connect 
individuals with content.41 Browsers organize content into consumable 
form.42 In the middle layer, hosts provide the protocols which platforms 
require to function.43 Transit providers connect hosts to the Internet.44 
Security providers ensure that content loads quickly and is protected from 
attack. At the bottom layer, Internet service and broadband providers handle 
the flow of data over the network. Throughout, payment systems make it 
possible to fund online enterprises.45 
What is notable about this account of the Internet’s structure is that, at 
every layer of the stack, virtually all of the Internet is privately-owned. 
Private companies control access to the Internet. There are some exceptions. 
Government entities participate in the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN), the organization that sets the rules for 
domain name registrars and registries; provide content on the web at .gov 
domains; and occasionally serve as Internet Service Providers.46 But, in the 
main, private entities are the Internet’s gatekeepers, determining who gets 
access and what online services, platforms, and applications can be viewed, 
accessed, and consumed. 
2. Digital Gatekeepers & Nation-State Minders 
Online spaces—the Internet—are not limitless zones of expression. In 
fact, they may be more limited than offline spaces. In practice, the 
                                                 
39. See Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the 
Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815 (2004). 
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New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1149, 1174 (2018). 
46. Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and Networked 
Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2007). 











permissibility and visibility of digital speech depends upon companies’ 
speech policies and practices.47 What a person says and reads online 
depends upon the decisions of digital infrastructure providers.48  
At the top layer, content platforms exert significant control over digital 
expression.49 In her exhaustive survey of the censorial powers of social 
media providers, Kate Klonick has aptly described them as the “new speech 
governors” due to the power that they wield over users’ expression.50 
Platforms have speech rules in terms-of-service (TOS) agreements and 
community guidelines. TOS agreements commonly prohibit child 
pornography, phishing, spam, fraud, copyright violations, impersonation, 
hate speech, nonconsensual pornography, violent extremism, and threats.51 
Typically, platforms rely on users to report TOS violations. With the help 
of moderators52 with varying degrees of review, platforms determine if the 
reported content (and sometimes the speaker) can remain online.  
Beyond the operation of speech policies in TOS agreements, companies 
use machine-learning algorithms to prioritize, obscure, or block expression 
before it ever appears.53 On Facebook’s News Feed, some content is 
highlighted while other content is hidden or blocked. Facebook employs 
algorithms to detect and remove terrorist speech.54 YouTube employs a tool 
called Content ID to prevent copyrighted material from being posted 
without the author’s consent.55 The dominant online platforms—Twitter, 
Facebook, Microsoft, and YouTube—are developing an industry database 
                                                 
47. See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering 
Digital Citizenship for our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435 (2011). 
48. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
49. CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 6, at 168. 
50. Klonick, supra note 48. 
51. Danielle Keats Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035 (2018). 
52. The major platforms have thousands of content moderators operationalizing speech rules and 
practices. Facebook says that by 2018 it will have 20,000 content moderators working on TOS 
complaints. Anita Balakrishnan, Facebook Pledges to Double Its 10,000-Person Safety and Security 
Staff by End of 2018, CNBC (Oct. 31, 2017, 7:59 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/31/facebook-
senate-testimony-doubling-security-group-to-20000-in-2018.html. 
53. Researchers have found that using algorithms to detect hate speech will result in far more 
false positives than false negatives because they cannot capture context—tone, speaker, and audience. 
NATASHA DUARTE ET AL., CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., MIXED MESSAGES? THE LIMITS OF 
AUTOMATED SOCIAL MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 4 (2017), https://perma.cc/B2UE-A26H. Although 
natural language processing algorithms can be trained to detect various combinations and collections of 
words, they cannot distinguish jokes, sarcasm, or rebuttals of hate speech from hateful statements. Id. at 
19. Algorithms also reinforce bias that exists in the training data—that is why they perform less 
accurately when analyzing the language of female speakers and African American speakers. Id. at 15.  
54. Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Will Use Artificial Intelligence to Uncover Extremist Posts, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 16, 2017, at B4. 
55. Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 499, 538 (2017). 












that will collect hashes—or unique digital fingerprints—of banned violent 
extremist content for instant flagging, review, and removal.56 
The power to control digital expression extends to all layers of the 
Internet. Without security protections, it can be impossible to remain 
online.57 Cloudflare, for instance, helps protect sites from distributed denial-
of-service attacks (DDoS).58 After the deadly neo-Nazi march in 
Charlottesville, Virginia, the Daily Stormer’s operator, Andrew Anglin, 
praised the man who drove a car into a crowd of civil rights activists and 
killed Heather Heyer. Cloudflare CEO Matthew Prince explained that 
hackers urged the company to “get out of the way” so that they could take 
the site off the Internet.59 In the face of public pressure, Cloudflare dropped 
Daily Stormer as a client.60 Hackers were able to shut down the Daily 
Stormer because it lacked protection from the hackers’ DDoS attacks. In a 
subsequent blog post, Prince expressed regret about having gotten involved 
with policing content.61 
Sometimes, market forces are behind companies’ retail and wholesale 
decisions to censor speech.62 As in Cloudflare’s case, companies may be 
caving to public pressure when they take away a particular speaker’s ability 
to engage online.63 They may alter their speech policies and practices to 
attract advertising fees and advocates’ approval.64 For some platforms, 
combating cyber harassment is key to their bottom line.65 In May 2013, 
fifteen companies, including Nissan, threatened to pull their ads on 
Facebook unless it removed profiles that glorified or trivialized violence 
against women.66 
                                                 
56. Kaveh Waddell, A Tool to Delete Beheading Videos Before They Even Appear Online, THE 
ATLANTIC (June 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/06/a-tool-to-delete-
beheading-videos-before-they-even-appear-online/488105/. Hashing is a “mathematical operation that 
takes a long stream of data of arbitrary length, like a video clip or string of DNA, and assigns it a specific 
value of a fixed length, known as a hash. The same files or DNA strings will be given the same hash, 
allowing computers to quickly and easily spot duplicates.” Jamie Condliffe, Facebook and Google May 
Be Fighting Terrorist Videos With Algorithms, MIT TECH. REV. (June 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/ 
DA72-X7RH.  
57. That is, anywhere except the Dark Web. 
58. Prince, supra note 40.  
59. Id. 
60. Steven Johnson, Why Cloudflare Let an Extremist Stronghold Burn, WIRED (Jan. 16, 2018, 
6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/XZW3-7D2C. 
61. Prince, supra note 40. 
62. Citron, Extremist Speech, supra note 51. 
63. Johnson, supra note 60. 
64. CITRON, HATE CRIMES, supra note 8, at 229. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 











In other instances, companies engage in private censorship to stave off 
threatened regulation.67 After terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels in late 
2015, European regulators excoriated tech companies for failing to combat 
terrorist recruitment on their platforms.68 Their message was clear: online 
platforms would face onerous civil and criminal penalties unless their 
policies and processes resulted in the rapid removal of extremist speech.69 
The major social media companies accommodated EU regulators’ demands 
because regulation of extremist and hateful speech was a real possibility in 
the European Union.70 
Payment providers can make it impossible for speakers to remain online. 
For instance, the sheriff of Cook County, Illinois wrote letters to credit-card 
companies demanding that they prohibit the use of their cards to purchase 
advertisements on Backpage.com since ads might be used for illegal sex-
related products or services.71 Backpage responded by seeking a preliminary 
injunction against the sheriff for violating its First Amendment rights.72 The 
court held that the sheriff had irreparably harmed Backpage.com by 
threatening coercive state action against credit card companies that 
facilitated payment of advertisements.73 The court directed the trial court to 
issue a temporary injunction ordering the sheriff to “take no actions, formal 
or informal, to coerce or threaten credit card companies, processors, 
financial institutions, or other third parties with sanctions intended to ban 
credit card or other financial services from being provided to 
Backpage.com.”74  
3. Cyber Mobs, Stalkers, and Trolls 
In 1997, it would have been difficult to foresee the threat to speech posed 
by cyber mobs and individual harassers. The Internet was still largely a tool 
for hobbyists and had not become the essential part of modern life that it 
occupies today. But now, after ten years of sustained research and public 
conversation about the phenomena of cyberstalking and harassment, it is 
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undeniable that not everyone can freely engage online.75 This is especially 
true for women, minorities, and political dissenters who are more often the 
targets of cyber mobs and individual harassers. In a connected vein, people 
who lack the economic means to purchase computers, broadband, and high-
end mobile phones cannot participate equally in digital life. 
Consider the case of online abuse. Cyberstalking often involves a perfect 
storm of rape threats, doxxing, nonconsensual pornography (also known as 
“revenge porn”), and reputation-harming lies.76 Stalkers impersonate 
victims on dating sites and call for strangers to rape them. They shut down 
victims’ sites with DDoS attacks.77 They falsely report victims’ profiles as 
TOS violations in the hopes that their profiles will be suspended or shut 
down.78 Cyberstalking victims have difficulty expressing themselves in the 
face of online assaults.79 They often withdraw from online activities. They 
shut down their blogs, sites, and social media profiles not because they tire 
of them, but because they hope to avoid provoking further abuse. The 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has described cyber harassment as 
“profoundly damaging to the free speech and privacy rights of the people 
targeted.” EFF recognized the fact that online harassment silences people, 
especially those with “less political or social power” and “women and racial 
and religious minorities.”80  
Political dissenters have faced online abuse at the hands of authoritarian 
regimes. A common strategy of “troll armies” is to drown out political 
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expression with spam.81 Saudi Arabian “cyber troops” flooded Twitter posts 
critical of the regime with unrelated content and hashtags to obscure the 
offending post.82 The Russian government has tried to silence dissenters by 
spreading falsehoods about them online. Human beings and bots, working 
on behalf of Russian President Vladimir Putin, relayed the defamatory posts 
through false accounts on social media sites.83 During the 2016 election, 
Russian-paid trolls attacked journalists critical of then presidential 
candidate Donald J. Trump.84  
4. Filter Bubbles, Polarization, and Other Pathologies  
One of the most touted advantages of the modern Internet has been 
personalization, whether for content, such as “more relevant” 
advertisements, or for software and devices that adapt to individuals’ 
preferences. Yet personalization has dangers. Almost two decades ago, Cass 
Sunstein warned that a personalized Internet risked creating a “Daily Me:” 
an informational monoculture that reflected each individual’s personal 
interests and biases while providing no information to disrupt 
preconceptions or prejudices. Sunstein was particularly concerned that the 
“Daily Me” could create destroy our shared democratic culture and the facts 
upon which democratic society depends and non-personalized twentieth-
century mass media had preserved.  
Algorithmic filtering can push people’s views to extremes. Likes on 
Facebook can deepen echo chambers, making it more likely that users see 
posts consistent with their views than those contrary to them.85 In turn, when 
groups with similar views get together, their members hear “more and 
louder echoes of their own voices.”86 As one of us (Citron) has described 
the phenomenon of group polarization: “Learning that others share their 
worldviews boosts their confidence. People embrace more radical views 
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because they feel more confident and because they want to be liked. They 
often exaggerate their views to convince others of their credibility, which 
leads to [a] sort of competition for persuasiveness . . . .”87 Hearing 
supportive voices for online abuse, for instance, encourages more abusive 
behavior.88 
Personalization can result in different online experiences based on 
variables other than politics—in ways that often disadvantage the 
marginalized. Harvard University Professor Latanya Sweeney found that 
searches of black-identifying names are twenty-five percent more likely to 
be served with arrest-related advertisements than searches of white 
identifying names.89 The study suggests that there is discrimination in the 
delivery of advertisements accompanying searches of people’s names. 
Similarly, a study by Carnegie Mellon researchers found that males were 
more likely to be shown advertisements encouraging the seeking of 
coaching services for high paying jobs than females.90 According to the 
study, there was a statistically significant difference in ads shown to men 
and women looking for jobs, with men being much more frequently targeted 
for ads offering high-paying jobs than women were.91 
II. POWER AND ITS PRIVATE DISCONTENTS 
A. Distrust of Power 
There are multiple, overlapping reasons why free speech enjoys 
exceptional protection under U.S. law, but most of them boil down to power. 
In one of the most important separate opinions in American law,92 Justice 
Louis Brandeis argued in Whitney v. California that free speech was worth 
protecting not for its own sake, but because it safeguarded the social 
processes of self-governance.93 In Brandeis’ self-governance theory, the act 
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of engaging in free expression produces not just merely better democratic 
decisions, but better democratic citizens.94 Free speech allows individuals 
to participate in the formation of public opinion.95 It permits citizens to 
influence—and see themselves as having influenced—state power.96  
Brandeis’ self-governance theory had a major truth-seeking element: 
“freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth.”97 More 
broadly, free speech is crucial for the creation of democratic culture.98 Free 
speech lets individuals express their values, emotions, opinions, ideas, art, 
and knowledge. It permits each and every one of us to participate in the 
development (and revision) of shared cultural meanings.99  
Yet at bottom, self-governance theory justifies crucial restraints on 
power. The right to free speech  
is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the 
area of public discussion . . . in the hope that use of such freedom will 
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity 
and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the 
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political 
system rests.100 
As Brandeis put it, the theory of the First Amendment was that: 
[b]elieving in the power of reason as applied through public 
discussion, [the Framers] eschewed silence coerced by law—the 
argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional 
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so 
that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. Fear of serious 
injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. 
Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to 
free men from the bondage of irrational fears.101 
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Concerns about power underlie the other leading theory of free speech 
that emphasizes its importance to the search for political and social truths.102 
In his dissent in Abrams v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
explained that special protections for free speech are necessary because of 
the natural human inclination to silence (by force if necessary) opinions that 
we dislike.103 “Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me,” he 
wrote, “perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your 
power and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express 
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition.”104 Holmes offered 
against this certainty, and power’s tendency to sweep away disagreement, a 
principle of epistemic doubt that has remained a defining hallmark of 
American First Amendment law. Holmes reasoned that the theory of the 
Constitution was that while truth is elusive, it is far better to allow others to 
hear what he called “opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with 
death” than to be deprived of that potential insight into truth, or at least the 
other side of the argument.105 As he put it well,  
when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they 
may come to believe even more than they believe the very 
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes 
safely can be carried out.106  
Holmes offers this principle of doubt as justification for restraints on the 
power of the state censor, the entity that would choke off dissent and 
disagreement through the use of its power. 
Other scholars have offered a third justification for free expression 
protections beyond self-governance and the search for truth – the argument 
that free speech is indispensable to individual autonomy. The account of 
free speech explains that people cannot decide for themselves how they 
want to direct their life projects while under the thumb of the state. The right 
to free speech is thus designed to restrain power from interfering with 
individual autonomy and dignity.107  
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Ultimately, protections for free speech reinforce the constitutional values 
of our polity—democratic politics, culture, truth seeking, and individual 
self-development. To protect these values, the project of free expression 
warns against power exercised to limit that expression. As Jack Balkin puts 
it well, freedom of speech ultimately  “concerns power—how to regulate it 
and hold it accountable.”108 Allowing individuals to participate in self-
government thus promotes the discovery of truth and builds a shared 
culture; and allowing individuals to freely express themselves gives power 
its legitimacy.109 
It has undeniably been the power of the state that has commanded the 
attention of judicial free expression doctrine and theory. Most obviously, 
this is because the First Amendment typically applies only to governments 
and not to private actors. More deeply, though, the traditions of First 
Amendment theory reflect a belief that government cannot be trusted to pick 
winners and losers in the realm of ideas because it will “tend to act on behalf 
of the ideological powers that be.”110 Government officials fear challenges 
to the status quo from dissenters who aim to replace them.111 Without strong 
free speech protections, outsiders may be unable to challenge governmental 
power through the practices of ordinary politics.112 Judge Easterbrook 
explained, in American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, that the Constitution 
“forbids the state to declare one perspective right and silence opponents.”113 
Yet as Gregory Magarian insightfully explores in his book Managed 
Speech, one of the trends of the Roberts Court’s First Amendment decisions 
is that they have reinforced state and corporate power at the expense of noisy 
dissenters challenging the status quo.114 It is becoming a bad time to be what 
Brandeis termed a “witch.” 
Doctrinally, the First Amendment applies to the exercise of state power 
that threatens free speech values.115 It covers laws, regulations, common law 
rules, or any action by a person or entity operating under cover of state law 
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or in connection with the state.116 It extends narrowly beyond the state to 
private parties that have assumed a traditional state function like running a 
town (though not when running a shopping mall, prison, or public utility).117 
The Supreme Court has taken a functional approach to state action, looking 
at the substance of whether state power is being used to direct the content 
of free speech rather than its timing or manner.118 Thus, in New York Times 
v. Sullivan, the Court extended the protection of the First Amendment to 
private-law defamation rules, for fear that government officials could censor 
their critics indirectly through private litigation rather than directly through 
criminal sedition prosecutions.119 
Nevertheless, the state action principle is a traditional constraint on 
constitutional doctrine, designed to ensure that constitutional law focuses 
on the problems of state power, such as censorship and political tyranny. 
American constitutional law has been built up over decades with this 
constraint and focus in mind, and while it is important to consider the state 
action doctrine functionally, it would be dangerous to substantially or 
completely jettison it. An overbroad understanding of state action would 
limit private efforts to protect free speech. If platforms like Facebook or 
Twitter were treated as quasi-governmental actors, they could not act as 
“Good Samaritans” to block the assaults of cyber mobs, as contemplated by 
the drafters of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.120 They could not 
protect against spam, doxxing, or impersonations. There is good in having 
private platforms wield some bounded power to address online abuse and 
other activity that imperils free expression.  
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Given the state action doctrine, an enormous amount of important 
expression lacks constitutional protection against the actions of powerful 
private entities, such as platforms, employers, and property owners. The 
owners of digital infrastructure, for example, are free to limit the speech of 
those over whom they exercise economic, social, or other forms of power. 
In a world where much of our traditional public gathering places are 
privately-owned, the opportunities for private censorship and interference 
with the exchange of ideas are widespread. In practice, censorship is more 
likely to come from companies controlling our digital infrastructure as from 
state, local, or federal governments.121  
Expressive freedom needs protection against private power.122 But that 
protection must come from sources other than the direct application of 
constitutional doctrine. If we are interested in the free exchange of ideas to 
promote self-governance, truth-seeking, democratic culture, and expressive 
autonomy, we should care about private speech restrictions. The state action 
doctrine could be amended to prevent certain kinds of private acts of 
censorship, but doing so would not fully address the problem of private 
speech restrictions without radically changing our notion of public and 
private. For better or worse, the public-private divide is foundational to our 
modern rights jurisprudence.123 As Julie Cohen argues, we need to pay 
“more careful attention to naming and demystifying emerging patterns of 
legal power and privilege” in our digital age.124  
 Private entities wield power over free speech that can be tantamount 
to—or in excess of—governmental power. They determine what content is 
and is not acceptable online. Not all private exercises of censorial power are 
equal, however. In the face of private censorship, people may have 
alternative outlets to express themselves. An individual blocked from 
commenting on The Atlantic’s website could express her views on 
Wired.com, or on a blog. A user banned from Facebook could recreate a 
social network elsewhere, though it would be time consuming and likely 
incomplete. But infrastructure is different. Without Cloudflare’s services, 
the Daily Stormer was knocked off the Internet.125 In certain locations, 
people may have only one broadband provider—being banned from that 
provider would mean no broadband Internet access at all. Cyber harassment 
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victims often find themselves with no choice but to retreat entirely from 
online engagement.126  
Then too, a private entity’s amassing of personal data is another way 
power is exerted over speakers and readers. Uber’s God View, which had 
the capacity to be used to monitor and harass investigative journalists, 
demonstrated the power that digital technologies can have over the press.127 
Platforms, search engines, broadband providers, and Internet service 
providers have varying degrees of access to, and control over, what we read, 
hear, and say online. 
Another way to think about censorial private platforms is to consider the 
First Amendment’s recognition of the press as a democratizing institution. 
That is not to suggest that platforms like Twitter or Facebook amount to the 
press descriptively or normatively, though the Supreme Court suggested so 
in Reno v. ACLU.128 Instead, it is to recognize the importance of 
infrastructures of speech and their importance to democracy and public trust 
more generally.  
There are other ways besides constitutional doctrine to protect free 
speech and expression. Legal protection for free expression need not take 
the dramatic form of judges declaring statutes or common law claims 
unconstitutional. Although such actions are probably necessary in 
extraordinary cases, they are not the ordinary way that law nurtures and 
defends our abilities to think and speak as we wish. Law can act away from 
the limelight of the Constitution and work to protect free expression in less 
dramatic, more subtle ways as well.  
Although largely overlooked in American legal culture, statutes and the 
common law can safeguard the ability to think, speak, and write freely. 
These legal tools are far older than our constitutional doctrine of free speech 
and represent an important way of protecting free expression in a number 
of important areas where constitutional doctrine is inapposite or ineffective. 
Our focus on the very successful project of First Amendment law has left 
these other tools in its shadow, largely forgotten and ignored. This is 
unfortunate, because these tools are arguably even more important than the 
doctrinal First Amendment in protecting freedom of speech.  
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Non-constitutional protection of expressive liberties can take at least 
three forms. At the most basic level, law helps to create the “expressive 
infrastructure” which makes a robust culture of free expression possible. 
Free expression is enabled by laws allowing for cheaper rates for 
newspapers, mandating common carrier rules for companies involved in the 
dissemination of speech like telephone and Internet companies, and public 
education at all levels including universities.129 Common law and statutes 
can be used to create parallel protections for free expression, such as the 
long-standing common law doctrine against prior restraints, or copyright’s 
idea/expression distinction and fair use doctrine.  
Where constitutional law is under-protective, common law and statutes 
can fill the gap by creating exemptions or other additional protections for 
expression. A good example of this gap-filling function is the widespread 
passage of press shield laws following Branzburg v. Hayes, which declined 
to create a constitutional rule protecting the anonymity of confidential news 
sources.130 Another example is Anti-SLAPP laws protecting against 
lawsuits brought to stifle speech. 
Finally, common law and statutes can be used to directly enable free 
expression through the creation of affirmative rights to speak, unlike 
constitutional doctrine, which is poorly suited to the creation of affirmative 
rights due to a number of doctrinal, separation of powers, and cultural 
limitations. First Amendment doctrine cannot mandate the creation or, 
alternatively, stop the elimination of parks and other public fora for speech. 
It merely forbids government discrimination among speakers based upon 
the content or viewpoint of their message. A government that dislikes the 
messages emanating from a particular forum is barred by the doctrinal First 
Amendment from discriminating against those messages but would not be 
barred from closing the forum entirely. By contrast, positive law can create, 
fund, and preserve these fora, creating affirmative entitlements to speak. 
These are merely a few illustrations of the use of non-constitutional rules 
to promote free expression. But unlike in the context of state power, we lack 
the same conceptual and moral vocabulary to talk about excesses of private 
power. A first step in this process, as we try to ensure the faithful translation 
of our expressive values to the digital age, is to recognize the need to 
develop principles to guide the deployment of legal rules to enable, nurture, 
and protect free expression against the excesses of powerful private and 
public actors. The following section advances four such principles.  
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III. ESSENTIAL PRECONDITIONS FOR DIGITAL EXPRESSION 
A. Avoiding Magical Thinking  
Like many revolutions, the information revolution unleashed by the mass 
adoption of networked technologies has its evangelists and its myths. Early 
Internet evangelists tended to emphasize the radical potential for the Internet 
to liberate human beings. More recent evangelists have emphasized Silicon 
Valley’s “disruptive innovation,” its capacity to continually replace old 
business models with new ones. Implicit is the belief that disruption is either 
intrinsically a good thing or that “innovation” tends to produce new good 
things rather than new bad ones.131 
However, in the two decades since the Internet’s adoption, our lived 
experience has not fulfilled these revolutionary promises. Digital 
technologies certainly have the capacity for revolutionary liberation, but 
they can just as easily be used for oppression. Authoritarian regimes have 
embraced digital technologies to monitor, surveil, and oppress their 
people.132 Even democratic regimes have eagerly used digital technologies 
for widespread surveillance.133 The Snowden revelations kick-started a 
conversation about government surveillance that continues over five years 
later.134 Government surveillance has been made far easier in the democratic 
West by the surveillance-based advertising model upon which “free” 
services like Google and Facebook have made their vast fortunes.135  
The Internet of the late 1990s was largely a zone of intellectual privacy; 
one in which Internet users (or “netizens,” to use the now abandoned phrase 
they used for themselves) could explore niche and unpopular interests free 
from surveillance. But as corporations realized that the Internet offered vast 
commercial opportunities, and as Congress repeatedly failed to pass 
baseline Internet privacy legislation, a surveillance-based advertising 
industry ascended. Eager to serve better targeted and “more relevant” 
advertisements, the commercial Internet has become the most surveilled 
zone of human activity in history. Even if one were to accept the debatable 
premise that surveillance-based advertising is a necessary evil to promote 
commerce, the prevalence of state and corporate surveillance in our digital 
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age undercuts the promises of revolutionary human liberation that heralded 
the mass public adoption of the World Wide Web twenty years ago. 
Disruptive innovation has a similarly mixed track record with regard to 
the Internet’s claimed promises of liberation. Over the past twenty years, 
technology companies have innovated and disrupted existing business 
models, ushering in unprecedented access to information and unprecedented 
means of low-cost communication. Yet disruptive innovation has imposed 
a heavy price. Google’s search engine may have enabled easy access to 
information to anyone with an Internet-connected smart phone or laptop, 
but Google’s business model of targeted advertisements has eviscerated the 
advertising upon which newspapers have depended for decades.136 While 
we can now easily look up when the new season of Game of Thrones will 
be available for streaming, newspapers have been forced to drastically 
reduce the size of their newsrooms and the quality and depth of their 
reporting.137 At the same time, digital diversions—whether streaming 
videos, cute pictures of cats, or the advertisements that fund them—may 
have made it more difficult to engage in the kind of sustained reading and 
critical thinking upon which a vital democracy depends. In his book The 
Shallows, Nicholas Carr offers substantial evidence that the skills our 
malleable brains need to navigate the connected, hyper-linked, short-
attention-span digital world may come at the cost of a diminution of our 
capacity for long, sustained thinking and reading.138  
Then there are the problems that social media companies have caused 
with their disruptive innovation. Beyond Facebook’s advertising success 
(which, like Google, has undermined the revenue model of the free press), 
the social media giant has recently come under sustained criticism for its 
spreading of filter bubbles, allowing foreign money to influence the most 
recent presidential election, and failing to stop the spread of “fake news.”139 
Twitter, on the other hand, has faced lawsuits by abusive individuals like 
Charles Johnson alleging that the company’s suspension of their accounts 
violates free speech rights under the California Constitution.140 At the same 
time, Twitter has been forced to defend its failure to discipline public figure 
users like President Donald Trump, who has insulted and threatened foreign 
and domestic enemies, including threatening North Korea with nuclear 
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attack, who has targeted private individuals with all manner of abuse, and 
who has mounted attacks on a free press as “enemies” of the people.141 
Our purpose in this analysis is not to demonize the Internet, or the 
technology companies that have made vast fortunes through innovative 
tools. Our purpose is more modest, which is to suggest that the Internet is a 
human creation, and that like all human creations, it has complexities that 
cannot be reduced to platitudes like those offered by tech liberation theories 
of the 1990s or disruptive innovation theories of the 2000s. Recognizing 
this fact suggests that in designing policies to ensure meaningful digital 
expression, we must avoid magical thinking of the sort that frequently enters 
into technology policy debates. We must make policy for the Internet and 
society that we actually have, not the Internet and society that we might 
want, or that we believed we would get twenty years ago. 
Crucial to the protection of digital speech is to recognize that the 
Constitution generally and the First Amendment specifically are not the 
only way to think about our commitment to digital speech. Positive law, 
social norms, and corporate practices are as important to free speech as 
constitutional doctrine. Platforms also reflect the unique cultures and norms 
of their users.142 As such, we cannot rely on them, or magical thinking about 
the utopian power of “disruptive innovation” or the invisible hand of the 
unregulated market (or the self-interested claims made by corporate 
marketing departments) to ensure the adequate protection of free expression 
in our digital society. Fundamentally, when we stop thinking magically, we 
must focus on questions of access and questions of power. 
B. Inputs Matter 
If we care about digital expression that is meaningfully and broadly 
available, then we need to start caring more about inputs. First Amendment 
doctrine typically focuses only on the value of expression, and the state’s 
impact on that expression. This is an entirely sensible approach for a system 
of negative rights limited by the state action doctrine and for a system that 
focuses limited judicial resources on questions over which they have the 
greatest institutional competence and legitimacy.  
But if we care not only about the First Amendment, but also about our 
meaningful ability to engage in free expression, then the First Amendment 
is not enough. The First Amendment is no protection for speakers whose 
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silence is due to an inability to access the Internet. It is no protection for 
speakers whose expression occurred on private platforms that blocked, 
filtered, or muted them. It is no protection for speakers subject to retaliation 
for daring to engage in expression that met with the disapproval of a cyber 
mob. 
Simply put, inputs matter. If we care about the meaningful ability to 
engage in free expression, and not just the formal capacity to be free from 
state censorship, our positive law and social policies need to focus on 
expressive inputs. Of course, there are many inputs that matter, including 
education and access to leisure time (and even sufficient nutrition), but we 
shall focus on three inputs that are critically important to digital expression 
in the present day—intellectual privacy, protection from harassment, and 
access to the benefits of technology. 
First, law must protect intellectual privacy. A critical foundation for 
meaningful free speech is the ability to generate new, outlandish, and 
potentially subversive ideas. First Amendment doctrine is highly protective 
of speakers’ ability to say things that are profane, subversive, blasphemous, 
and insulting without fear of state coercion, but it has paid relatively little 
attention to the processes by which speakers come to generate ideas in the 
first place.143 In a series of articles and a book, one of us (Richards) has 
argued that our law should protect the value of “intellectual privacy” —
freedom from surveillance or interference as we think, read, speak privately, 
or otherwise engage in the practice of generating new ideas.144 Yet 
government and private surveillance has turned the Internet—once touted 
by libertarian utopianists as a realm of unmonitored access to pure 
thought—into the single most surveilled realm of human activity in history. 
Democratic governments, platforms, and advertisers constantly seek to 
monitor what we watch, read, and write online, for a variety of purposes 
ranging from the prevention of crime to the pursuit of the perfectly targeted 
advertisement. These may at times be useful pursuits, but they are not as 
important as the enablement of democratic deliberation.145  
Simply put, when we are watched, we change our behavior, inclining it 
to the boring, the bland, and the mainstream. Our constantly-monitored 
Internet is a threat to the development of new political and ideological ideas 
upon which our commitments to intellectual freedom and democratic self-
                                                 
143. See RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY, supra note 10. 
144. See, e.g., id.; Richards, Dangers of Surveillance, supra note 10; Neil M. Richards, 
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX L. REV. 387 (2008); Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 
supra note 93; Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, supra note 10. 
145. For a sustained argument along this specific line of analysis, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
#REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2017) (arguing in favor of 
“democratic deliberation” in favor of consumer empowerment as a value in a democracy).  












government depend.146 In developing laws to regulate commerce and 
surveillance in the digital age, we should not allow the logic of surveillance 
that motivates business intelligence and law enforcement to create a data 
collection environment of perfect surveillance. Environments of 
untrammeled data collection nudge conformity and stifle, if not extinguish, 
dissent, eccentricity, and creativity. We need to press back against the 
inexorable pull of what one of us (Citron) has termed the “data collection 
imperative.”147 
Second, as one of us (Citron) has argued in a series of articles and a book, 
law, culture, and technology should be brought to bear against online 
assaults that drive people offline. Law is crucial to deter, redress, and punish 
cyber mobs and individual harassers who close off avenues for interaction 
and expression that the Internet opens for most. A legal agenda would serve 
an expressive role as well, teaching us that online assaults inflict grave 
damage to victims’ important opportunities and to society at large. 
A “cyber civil rights” legal agenda should include tort, criminal, and civil 
rights law.148 In theory, victims can sue their attackers for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and public disclosure of private 
facts (in case of nude photos posted without consent). In practice, however, 
these lawsuits are expensive to pursue and many victims lack the resources. 
In what we hope becomes a trend, pioneering law firms like K&L Gates 
have devoted pro bono resources to combat online abuse so victims with 
little means can sue their harassers.149 Prosecutors should use the tools that 
they have to investigate and prosecute cyber-stalkers, including threat laws 
and cyber-stalking laws.150 Crucially, thirty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia now criminalize the nonconsensual posting of someone’s nude 
images online.151 Federal bills to ban nonconsensual disclosure of intimate 
images have strong bipartisan support. Civil rights laws should be enforced 
against stalkers who interfere with victims’ employment opportunities 
because they belong to traditionally subordinated groups.152 
What about platforms that host online assaults? Some platforms solicit 
abuse yet still they can argue, quite correctly, that they enjoy immunity from 
liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. As one of 
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us (Citron) and Benjamin Wittes have argued, the time has come to revisit 
section 230’s immunity provision.153 Section 230 was meant to encourage 
self-monitoring from parties in the best position to efficiently prevent harm 
to third parties.154 It was meant to immunize platforms from liability related 
to under- and over-filtering of “offensive” material.155 The problem is that 
an overbroad interpretation of Section 230 enables the exercise of great 
power with no concomitant responsibility.156 Sites not only can deliberately 
ignore reports of abuse, but they also can encourage and solicit abuse and 
still enjoy the shelter of section 230’s immunity provision.157 Federal 
lawmakers should revise Section 230 to condition the immunity on 
reasonable efforts to address known illegality.158  
Third, the promise of technology must be available to all and not 
thwarted by a deepening of the so-called “digital divide.” The economic, 
expressive, and other opportunities enabled by digital technologies will be 
limited at best if only the privileged can enjoy them. This is a reality that 
even Silicon Valley recognizes.159 However, despite the broad recognition 
of the problem of the digital divide, it remains under-theorized and under-
addressed in the legal literature.  
In privacy scholarship, two influential books have examined the 
sociology of how poverty impacts privacy rights. In Overseers of the Poor, 
John Gilliom explored how the welfare system deprives recipients of any 
privacy agency.160 In The Poverty of Privacy Rights, Khiara Bridges 
powerfully demonstrated that poor mothers are subject to invasive, 
persistent state surveillance, whether or not they receive public funding for 
prenatal care, at great cost to their self-worth and equal standing as 
citizens.161 These works demonstrate how the state uses its provision of 
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public benefits and concern about child welfare to deprive individuals of 
meaningful privacy protections.  
In the context of platforms and free expression, however, the literature is 
underdeveloped. This has likely been the case because in the American legal 
academy, “free expression” has for decades meant the First Amendment; 
the vast body of constitutional doctrine has certainly provided a fertile 
ground for scholarly analysis. However, one unfortunate consequence has 
been that most legal academics have focused on judicial doctrines of 
equality of treatment for expression rather than on the practical matter of 
equality of access to expressive channels.162 Although few exceptions in the 
literature exist, the single-minded focus on legal doctrine rather than the 
actual ability to access the Internet means that we lack a basic vocabulary 
to talk about power and inequality in the realm of free expression when the 
state is not involved. For law to enable free expression in the new digital 
expressive environment, we must ensure that the access to that environment 
is not limited to the privileged few, and that we have the words, models, and 
examples to talk about these problems critically and constructively. 
C. Structure Matters 
Beyond inputs, we need to pay attention to the social, economic, and 
technical structures that facilitate digital expression. This requires us to 
focus on the structure of what Thomas Emerson helpfully called our 
“system of free expression.”163 Legal rules and policies affecting free 
expression must take into account the structures upon which they operate. 
Legal rules do not operate in a vacuum, and different rules will operate 
differently in different structures.   
The design of policies to promote digital expression must take into 
account the structures of free speech in a digital age. Two factors are 
particularly important in designing these rules. First, our rules must be 
suitable for the level of the stack we are talking about. Second, we must 
ensure, either via network neutrality concepts or other basic rules of 
fairness, that private gatekeepers cannot be permitted to unreasonably 
throttle, block, or censor expression.  
When thinking about the structure of our system of free expression, we 
must first consider the context in which a rule operates, as well as its 
relationship to the system as a whole. Consider again the “stack” metaphor’s 
conception of the Internet as involving the backbone as the bottom (or 
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essential foundation) and applications and content as higher up in a “stack” 
of technical and social processes. Companies operating at different layers 
of the stack have varying degree of power over digital expression. That 
power differential should be central to a legal regime designed to protect 
against private companies’ power over expression in the digital age. Rules 
that make sense for Internet service providers, where there are few 
alternatives and limited (or no) competition in the market and where control 
over access to the Internet can be total, might make no sense for content 
platforms, where there is considerable market competition and alternative 
outlets for speech.    
In assessing the power differentials of different layers of the stack, 
lawmakers must avoid falling under the spell of new technologies and the 
magical thinking that they inevitably inspire. New technologies are often 
viewed as inherently valuable. The tendency is to credit (and even to 
fetishize) a new technology’s potential upsides and discredit its possible 
downsides. Big Data, for instance, is often billed as the “New Oil.”164 
Blinded by arguments concerning trade secrets and social utility, 
legislatures and courts have yet to reckon with the negative externalities 
wrought by the scoring, ranking, and rating of individuals enabled by Big 
Data.165 Furthermore, many judges and commentators fail to appreciate the 
complexity of the Internet, the nuances of the stack, or the critical 
technological and social contexts that operate differently at its different 
levels. 
The Supreme Court in Packingham fell into precisely these traps of 
reductionism andmagical thinking.The Court left some room for nuance, 
however. At the outset, the Court acknowledged that the digital revolution 
is wide-ranging, and that judges should tread carefully lest they rule broadly 
in ways that create problems for the law in the future. It explained that:  
While we now may be coming to the realization that the Cyber Age 
is a revolution of historic proportions, we cannot appreciate yet its 
full dimensions and vast potential to alter how we think, express 
ourselves, and define who we want to be. The forces and directions 
of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far reaching that courts 
must be conscious that what they say today might be obsolete 
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On the other hand, as Justice Alito pointed out astutely in his concurring 
opinion (in which he was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas): 
“It is regrettable that the Court has not heeded its own admonition of 
caution.”167 By treating the Internet and cyberspace in a unitary way, the 
Court suggested that all of cyberspace (or at least its “vast democratic 
forums”) amounted to a public forum subject to the full force of the First 
Amendment, a suggestion that, if taken seriously, could make it needlessly 
difficult for legislatures to deal with real problems of crime, abuse, stalking, 
hacking, harassment, and fraud in digital contexts. 
How courts talk about the Internet matters, not only in how they decide 
individual cases, but also in how they frame similar issues for future courts. 
Unfortunately, in Packingham, the Court conflated the Internet and social 
media as meaning essentially the same thing. Then too, the Court said that 
different content platforms were the same—Facebook is interchangeable 
with LinkedIn and Twitter, in other words. In so doing, the Court ignored 
the importance of context, and in particular failed to recognize the crucial 
differences in the different layers of the stack, let alone the different 
affordances (and limits) of the various content platforms.  
Packingham dealt with an unreasonably overbroad government rule that 
interfered with sex offenders’ ability to access the Internet and engage in 
the social processes of free expression. But as we have explained, 
government power is not the only kind of power that can affect our ability 
to express ourselves using digital tools. The private gatekeepers that 
exercise control over the Internet’s expressive infrastructure exercise 
substantial power over opportunities to speak, engage, interact, and 
associate freely. We must be careful to ensure that this power is also 
checked in the interests of promoting free expression. Here too, law has a 
role to play, in making sure that these gatekeepers cannot unreasonably 
throttle or censor the expression of others, through commitments to network 
neutrality and other basic rules of fairness. 
A systematic exploration of the potential regulatory regimes for the 
varying stacks of the Internet is a project for another day. For now, we note 
a few rules of thumb. Private power over digital expression should be paired 
with responsibility to the public. As a company’s power over digital 
expression grows closer to total (meaning there are few to no alternatives to 
express oneself online), the greater the responsibilities (via regulation) 
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attendant to that power. When companies wield power over speech that is 
akin to state power, regulation should be tailored to reflect that power.  
Consider public utilities. In the industrial age, public utility regulation 
emerged to address private power over essential infrastructure, such as 
railroads and telephones. In the information age, the backbone layer of the 
Internet stack wields similar influence over our political economy. That 
includes broadband providers that are already considered common carriers 
under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934. But it should also include 
Internet service providers that determine whether one has any online access 
in some locations. The same might be said of security services like 
Cloudflare that have the power to wipe a site off the Internet.168  
D. Values Matter 
If we are to craft laws and policies that promote meaningful digital free 
expression, we have argued, we must avoid magical thinking and be 
attentive to the inputs and structure of our expressive infrastructure. Laws 
and policies affecting digital expression cannot be merely neutral or 
narrowly procedural; they must be substantive, which is to say that we must 
do our best to ensure that the values of the First Amendment are faithfully 
translated to the digital environment. This means that we must steer the 
difficult course between recognizing that the digital environment has 
features that are different from the mass media and physical world of the 
twentieth century, while remaining immune from the romantic lure and 
magical thinking of Internet exceptionalism. 
We must also ensure that the First Amendment continues to apply in 
digital formats but not be seduced by overbroad readings of the First 
Amendment. In our opinion, the Reno and Packingham cases came out the 
right way: they correctly invalidated clumsy attempts by legislatures that 
were either intended to force digital expression into a particular anodyne 
direction (Reno) or designed to deal with a real problem in a way that was 
highly overbroad (Packingham). But easy cases can make bad law too. Each 
case reached the correct result but on the basis of a flawed and unrealistic 
view of the Internet as it actually operates, a view that could cause mischief 
not only in other court cases, but also in legislative and agency decision-
making regarding digital speech. Put simply, how we talk about the Internet 
matters, and theory matters.  
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Beyond the First Amendment’s foundational commitment to debate on 
public matters that is uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, we believe that 
any theory animating legal rules to protect free speech in the digital age 
should keep a number of core principles in mind. Fundamentally, we must 
faithfully translate the principles of our analog twentieth century to the 
digital twenty-first century. Part of this process will be the traditional 
processes of translation that have been discussed in the legal literature since 
Joel Reidenberg’s and Lawrence Lessig’s pioneering work in the 1990s.169 
In this respect, the translation to digital formats of hard-won, expressive 
liberties against the state will remain as important as the translation of other 
fundamental rights, such as the Fourth Amendment’s protection of 
privacy.170 But just as digital privacy rights require protection against both 
public and private actors, so does the right to free expression. Even when 
the First Amendment is properly translated to the digital context, we need 
to make sure that its values are advanced against private power in digital 
environments where the state action doctrine renders constitutional doctrine 
inapplicable. If we are committed to ensuring that our expressive traditions 
survive the translation to the digital age, nurturing the capacity of free 
speech in privately-controlled online environments will be essential.  
No doubt, this part of the project will be challenging. Whereas the Anglo-
American legal tradition has a vocabulary and legal regime for dealing with 
government power dating back centuries, if not to the Magna Carta itself, 
our tradition is much less developed with respect to private power. Because 
we lack an agreed-upon vocabulary to deal with private acts of censorship, 
developing legal tools to deal with that problem will be challenging. 
Nevertheless, it is a challenge we must take up if we want to ensure that our 
hard-won commitment to expressive liberties in the twentieth century 
survives the twenty-first. 
CONCLUSION 
In Packingham, the Court explained that the “the Cyber Age is a 
revolution of historic proportions” whose “full dimensions and vast 
potential to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want 
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to be” have not been fully realized.171 It warned that the Internet’s positive 
potential was “so new, so protean, and so far reaching.”172 On the other 
hand, criminal downsides to the Internet were merely hypothetical.173 
Although the costs of cyberstalking, impersonation, and identity theft (to 
name just a few) were already well documented, the majority described the 
Internet as a new technology that had not yet been exploited for criminal 
ends: “For centuries now, inventions heralded as advances in human 
progress have been exploited by the criminal mind. New technologies, all 
too soon, can become instruments used to commit serious crimes. The 
railroad is one example, and the telephone another. So, it will be with the 
Internet and social media.”174  
In one important sense, the Court’s analysis in Packingham hit the nail 
on the head entirely. Although its “Cyber Age” rhetoric seems a bit dated, 
the Court is exactly correct that the digital revolution is radically reshaping 
how we think, read, and communicate. The effects of this transformation on 
our expressive culture, arts, and politics cannot be fully understood while 
we are in the midst of such rapid and ever-morphing change. It is important, 
as the Court suggested, to move cautiously and with intellectual and 
epistemic modesty as we try to chart a course to ensure our commitments to 
free speech adapt to changing social and technological circumstances. 
But as this article has explained, in another more fundamental sense, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Packingham was woefully misguided. Whether 
we call it the digital revolution or “the Cyber Age,” it is essential that we 
take our networked society as it is rather than we (or the marketing 
departments of technology companies) would like it to be. In thinking about 
how to protect free speech and other civil liberties in digital environments, 
we must remain modest, but we must also be realistic about the costs and 
the challenges posed by our largely privately-owned expressive 
infrastructure. At the same time that we are translating our free speech 
protections to our rapidly changing digital contexts, we need to be wary of 
the problem of private power, so that our new system of free expression is 
crafted to deal with the real challenges it faces, rather than ones it fails to 
consider.  
This is a real challenge, and whether and how we respond to it will be 
one of the defining legacies of our time. At stake is nothing less than self-
government itself. As we move cautiously but realistically into our digital 
brave new world, we should keep in mind the four principles we have 
outlined in this article—the avoidance of magical thinking, the importance 
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of inputs and structure, and the need to remain true to the values that have 
animated our First Amendment tradition, when dealing with private power 
in addition to that of the state. Other principles will inevitably be needed, 
but these four are a good place to start. 
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